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ABSTRACT 
 
The Engineering Sciences Center at Sandia National Laboratories provided an independent peer 
review of the structural analysis supporting the National Transportation Safety Board 
investigation of the August 1, 2007 collapse of the I-35W Bridge in Minneapolis. The purpose of 
the review was to provide an impartial critique of the analysis approach, assumptions, solution 
techniques, and conclusions.  Subsequent to reviewing numerous supporting documents, a SNL 
team of staff and management visited NTSB to participate in analysis briefings, discussions with 
investigators, and examination of critical elements of the bridge wreckage. This report 
summarizes the opinion of the review team that the NTSB analysis effort was appropriate and 
provides compelling supporting evidence for the NTSB probable cause conclusion. 
 
 
4 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
The authors wish to acknowledge the cooperation of the NTSB staff and management who were 
very supportive of this peer review effort. Also, Art Ratzel and Sheldon Tieszen of SNL 
provided valuable comments in reviewing this document.  
 
5 
 
CONTENTS 
 
1. Introduction................................................................................................................................. 7 
2. Definition of the Analysis Problem ............................................................................................ 8 
2.1 Physical Evidence ............................................................................................................... 8 
2.2 Review of Original Bridge Design ..................................................................................... 8 
2.3 Material Inspection ............................................................................................................. 8 
2.4 Sequencing Study................................................................................................................ 8 
3. Structural Analysis...................................................................................................................... 9 
3.1 Modeling Approach ............................................................................................................ 9 
3.2 Loads and Boundary Conditions......................................................................................... 9 
3.3 Material Properties............................................................................................................ 10 
4. Analysis Results........................................................................................................................ 11 
5. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 12 
6. References................................................................................................................................. 13 
 
 
 
6 
 
NOMENCLATURE 
 
 
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board 
FHWA Federal Highway Administration 
SNL Sandia National Laboratories 
 
 
7 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
On August 1, 2007, the I-35W Bridge across the Mississippi River in Minneapolis, Minnesota 
collapsed suddenly, resulting in 13 deaths and 145 injuries. As part of an effort to determine 
probable cause, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) led a thorough on-site 
investigation. In addition to examining the recovered wreckage, they conducted an extensive 
review of design files, historic inspection reports, eye witness accounts, and available 
photographic evidence.  
 
Review of the evidence led to the identification of the likely initiation points for the collapse. 
Based on this knowledge, NTSB, in conjunction with the Federal Highway Administration 
(FHWA), commissioned a subsequent analysis effort to examine the stress and deformation of 
critical structural elements under the reconstructed loading conditions at the time of collapse. 
The analysis also provided insight into the influence of possible structural abnormalities 
identified in pre-collapse photographic evidence. A detailed report of the analysis effort is 
available [Ref. 1]. 
 
The NTSB requested Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) to conduct an impartial peer review of 
the structural analysis. The purpose of the peer review was to provide an independent opinion of 
the quality and validity of the methods, approach, and conclusions drawn. To fulfill its mission 
for the National Nuclear Security Administration stockpile stewardship program, SNL maintains 
a diverse technical workforce including staff skilled in high deformation structural mechanics 
that are characteristic of accident scenarios.  The SNL review team comprised two senior staff 
members from the Engineering Sciences Center with expertise in the development and 
application of computational methods for structural collapse and material failure. A SNL line 
manager responsible for external engagements on structural mechanics also participated. 
 
After initially reviewing numerous records associated with the investigation, the Sandia team 
visited the NTSB Training Center in Washington, DC on July 23, 2008. The team examined 
critical elements of the wreckage and was briefed in depth on the analysis approach, results, and 
conclusions. Follow-up discussions between the investigators and the review team helped to 
clarify critical aspects of the collapse analysis. As summarized below, it is the opinion of the 
review team that the NTSB analysis effort was complete, and conclusions concerning the likely 
cause of collapse are appropriate. 
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2. DEFINITION OF THE ANALYSIS PROBLEM 
 
Photographs of the bridge wreckage show extensive damage to several sections as a consequence 
of the progressive collapse [Ref. 2]. The on-site investigation conducted by NTSB helped to 
focus attention on the center span of the bridge between piers 6 and 7 as the origin of the 
collapse. Specifically, the evidence summarized briefly below was used to appropriately focus 
the analysis effort on the connections identified as U10 and L11.  
 
2.1 Physical Evidence 
The video taken by the security camera at the lock on the west side of the bridge indicates the 
failure event initiated to the south of joint U12 [Ref. 3]. Joint L11 West was just visible in the 
camera’s field of view while L11 East was not visible. Neither of the U10 East or West joints 
was visible in the video of the collapse. Previous field studies captured photographic evidence of 
severe out-of-plane deformation (bowing) of the U10 gusset plates, and inspection reports 
documented corrosion in the L11 gusset plates.  Forensic evidence (location of the final resting 
place, final deformed shape, and tearing patterns of the failed truss components) was collected 
and indicated the U10 joint as the likely failure initiation location.  
 
2.2 Review of Original Bridge Design 
The design calculations conducted by FHWA [Ref. 4] showed that the gusset plates at L11 and 
U10 had inadequate thickness, even by design procedures applicable during the 1960’s, at the 
time the bridge was built. In addition, the free edge length to thickness ratio of the U10 gusset 
plate was sufficiently large to have required edge stiffening according to code, but no such 
stiffening existed. Subsequent modification of the bridge, including increasing the deck thickness 
and addition of median barriers, significantly increased the dead load, further emphasizing the 
inadequacy of these designs. 
 
2.3 Material Inspection 
Tensile and hardness testing [Ref. 1] of samples extracted from the U10 gusset plate and rivets 
did not indicate any mechanical properties anomalies. The tensile tests of the gusset plate 
material provided high quality mechanical properties data suitable for non-linear analysis. 
Corrosion of L11 was noted and used in subsequent analyses 
 
2.4 Sequencing Study 
The sequencing report is a compilation of available data into a chronological description of the 
collapse scenario [Ref. 5]. The review team feels that the focus on the U10/L11 joint locations by 
the NTSB staff is a logical conclusion of the evidence as supported in the sequencing report. 
Focusing the subsequent analysis effort on these joints represents prudent engineering judgment.  
 
 
9 
 
3. STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 
 
NTSB commissioned a computational analysis effort to better understand the stress and 
deformation states of the U10 and L11 joints at the time of the collapse. The effort enabled 
further examination of the adequacy of the joint designs and the influence of known 
imperfections such as corrosion and bowing of the gusset plates. Most importantly, it addressed 
the question of whether the loads known to be present at the time of collapse were, within 
uncertainty bounds, sufficient to cause geometric instability in these joints, a precursor to 
collapse of the center span. Photographic evidence indicates that prior to collapse the gusset plate 
at U10 had out-of-plane deformation on the order of the plate thickness. This is a problematic 
situation for a gusset plate, as the design methodology only accounts for in-plane behavior. This 
bowing of the plate edge is important to the determination of the bridge collapse. 
 
The Sandia review of the NTSB analysis effort focused on the approach and methodology of the 
bridge collapse determination. This review assessed the appropriateness of the work completed 
by the NTSB staff and whether the engineering approach is prudent to support the conclusions. 
Summary comments concerning the analysis approach, inputs, and results interpretation are 
provided below. 
 
3.1 Modeling Approach 
The finite element analyses of the truss section of the bridge comprised two types: a beam 
model, and secondly this beam model enhanced with localized, embedded detail models of the 
U10 and L11 joints employing shell/continuum elements. A nonlinear analysis using the Riks 
algorithm was used to identify stable configurations in response to the applied loads. Failure to 
converge to a solution using this approach is indicative of a geometric instability of the joint, a 
precursor to likely structural failure. The instability or capacity determination showed no 
significant sensitivity to analysis options, including element type, hourglass mode control, and 
mesh refinement, providing confidence that there were no unidentified numerical issues [Ref. 6].  
 
The photographs of the U10 gusset plate bowing were very beneficial to the analysis effort [Ref. 
7]. Purely geometric representations (zero initial stress) were incorporated into the model to 
assess the potential for weakening of the joint. It should be noted that there is no photographic 
evidence of the L11 gusset to suggest the presence of bowing, so none was included in the 
model. L11 did show evidence of corrosion as reported in prior inspection reports. The presence 
of corrosion in the L11 gusset plate was addressed in the modeling through thinning of the plate 
definition [Ref. 8]. The distributed thickness was based on measurements of the deformed plate 
recovered from the wreckage. 
 
3.2 Loads and Boundary Conditions 
Both models used very detailed and thoroughly researched load definitions [Ref. 9]. The level of 
uncertainty in the loading definitions was reduced to a very acceptable engineering level. Cores 
were taken and tested to define the thickness and density of the bridge deck. Recovered vehicles 
were weighed and their likely locations were determined from their final resting place and 
eyewitness accounts. The weights of the concrete barriers for the center median were calculated 
based on known volume and density. Aerial photographs taken prior to the collapse combined 
with delivery information provided the weight and location of the construction materials. These 
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construction materials represent the largest source of variability in loading, and NTSB staff have 
adequately researched and identified these loads and their variability. All loads were 
appropriately placed on the bridge model regarding both magnitude and location. Boundary 
conditions used for both model types are appropriate for the representation of the bridge and 
were verified by early dynamic testing conducted by the University of Minnesota [Ref. 10]. 
 
3.3 Material Properties 
Material properties definitions used in both models were based on physical cores and material 
testing of the components, providing an accurate material behavior definition for the analyses. 
The translation of the mechanical properties of the gusset plate steel from engineering-stress, 
engineering-strain (typical result from tensile testing) to Cauchy-stress, logarithmic-strain 
(suitable for input to a large deformation finite element analysis) was appropriately performed 
[Ref. 11]. 
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4. ANALYSIS RESULTS 
 
The analysis review team agrees with the finding by the NTSB investigators that the initiation of 
the bridge collapse likely occurred at the U10 gusset plate. The geometric bowing of the gusset 
plate reduced the capacity compared to the undeformed joint, bringing it to within a reasonable 
estimate of the load at the time of collapse. The analyses also showed that without the initial 
bowing of the 0.5 inch gusset plate, the capacity of the bridge was greater than the loads present 
at the time of the collapse, illustrating the importance of this initial imperfection. Support of the 
free-edge as defined by code would have been beneficial to the stability of this under-designed 
joint. When analyzed using 1 inch thick gusset plates without stiffening (code allowable design) 
the capacity of this joint far exceeded the load present on the bridge. 
 
It is fundamental to note that this collapse is a geometrically induced failure, not a tensile 
material failure. This is why the state of strain in the gusset plate was below the failure strain in 
all of the analyses presented by the NTSB (4% plastic strain vs. >20% failure strain). The 
sensitivity of the bridge capacity to out-of-plane gusset bowing is direct – as the bowing 
approaches the plate thickness the capacity drops. The failure scenario is initiated by out-of-
plane or lateral displacement of the gusset – this lateral displacement requires a moment in the 
gusset plate to maintain the joint stability. When the moment capacity of the plate is exceeded 
the joint becomes unstable, forming a plastic hinge in the gusset plate, subsequently tearing from 
the rivet line as the plastic hinge progresses down the length of the plate. At the point of 
instability, the analysis code could no longer find an equilibrium state for the structure. The 
analysis of the post-instability failure sequence is very difficult, and unnecessary to the 
conclusions of this investigation, as the plastic hinge capacity is greatly exceeded by the load 
requirement.  
 
The effect of the corrosion in the L11 gusset plate was included in several analyses. Analyses 
that included the corroded L11 gusset plate without the bowing in the U10 plate showed greater 
load capacity than that of the bowed U10 gusset plate alone [Ref. 10]. In all cases addressed, the 
deformations in the L11 joint were lower than those recorded by U10. Combined with the video 
evidence that shows that L11W maintained its integrity as the center span approached the water, 
the analysis supports the bowed U10 joint as the weakest link.  
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
At the request of the NTSB, a team of structural mechanics engineers from Sandia National 
Laboratories reviewed the analysis supporting the investigation of the collapse of the I-35W 
Bridge in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Based on extensive review of the analysis effort including 
background investigative details and supporting documentation, it is the opinion of the review 
team that the NTSB analysis was conducted thoroughly and that the conclusions drawn 
supporting the probable cause of collapse are appropriate. Analysis results support the 
conclusion that the capacity of the under-designed U10 joint was reduced by the presence of 
bowing in the gusset plates, making it the likely point of collapse initiation. 
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